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DISCRETION VERSUS SUPERSESSION: CALIBRATING THE
POWER BALANCE BETWEEN LOCAL PROSECUTORS AND
STATE OFFICIALS†
ABSTRACT
Driven by shifts in public opinion, reform-minded prosecutors recently have
unseated “tough-on-crime” incumbent prosecutors in local elections all across
the United States. As these reformers institute more liberal prosecution policies,
the “tough-on-crime” legal establishment in their states will be tempted to rely
on laws allowing state officials to supersede local prosecutors.
This Comment identifies the landscape in which supersession efforts will
likely take place and offers a view as to the best way to calibrate local and state
decision-making on this terrain. It first reviews the range of supersession laws
that presently exist in the United States. It then singles out one state’s
supersession regime—Pennsylvania’s—as striking the right balance between
local discretion and state oversight, and advocates for its adoption in other
states to both preserve prosecutorial discretion and prevent illegitimate
prosecutorial abuses of power.

†

Writing.

This Comment received the Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and

YEARGAIN COMMENT_GALLEYPROOFS

96

10/3/2018 10:06 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:95

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 97
I. CHANGES IN PUBLIC OPINION AND PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE .. 100
A. Introduction and Overview ....................................................... 100
B. Electoral Consequences of the Shift in Public Opinion ............ 102
C. Predictions for the Future ........................................................ 107
II. A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY: FIVE MODELS OF PROSECUTORIAL
SUPERSESSION ................................................................................... 110
A. States Where a State Official Can Supersede a Local Prosecutor
in All Cases ............................................................................... 113
B. States Where a State Official Can Supersede a Local Prosecutor
When It Is in the Public Interest or in the Interest of Justice ... 116
C. States Where the State Official Can Supersede a Local Prosecutor
When Requested to Do so by Either Another State Official or
Members of the Public .............................................................. 118
D. States Where the State Official Can Supersede a Local Prosecutor
if She Refuses to (or Does Not) Enforce the Law ..................... 121
E. States Where a Local Prosecutor Can Be Superseded with the
Approval of a Court (or an Independent Commission) ............ 124
F. Summary of State Statutory Models .......................................... 125
III. THE NEED FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND HOW TO PROTECT
IT ....................................................................................................... 126
A. The Practical and Constitutional Case for Prosecutorial
Discretion ................................................................................. 126
B. The Solution: An Abuse of Discretion Standard ....................... 131
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 136

YEARGAIN COMMENT_GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

10/3/2018 10:06 AM

DISCRETION VERSUS SUPERSESSION

97

INTRODUCTION
On January 14, 2017, Markeith Loyd was arrested for murdering Sade
Dixon, his pregnant ex-girlfriend, and Orlando Police Lieutenant Debra
Clayton.1 A month later, Loyd was indicted by a grand jury on two counts of
first-degree murder.2 Aramis Ayala, the recently-elected local prosecutor in
Orlando, announced at a hastily arranged press conference that she would not
seek the death penalty against Loyd.3 But Ayala went one step further,
announcing that her office would not seek the death penalty against any
defendants:
While I currently do have discretion to pursue death sentences, I have
determined that doing so is not in the best interest of this community,
or the best interest of justice. After careful review and consideration
of the new statute, under my administration, I will not be seeking [the]
death penalty in [the] cases handled in my office.4

Just hours after Ayala’s press conference, Florida Governor Rick Scott
issued an executive order reassigning Loyd’s case from Ayala’s office to that of
Brad King,5 the local prosecutor for a neighboring judicial circuit known for his
strong support for the death penalty.6 Scott relied on a century-old and rarelyused provision in Florida law allowing him to reassign cases from one state
attorney to another for a “good and sufficient reason.”7 Ayala challenged Scott’s

1
Caitlin Doornbos & Gal Tziperman Lotan, Markeith Loyd Indicted on First-Degree Murder Charges,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 15, 2017, 4:50 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/markeith-loyd/osmarkeith-loyd-state-attorney-20170215-story.html.
2
Id. Aramis Ayala later asserted that her statement did not foreclose the possibility of seeking the death
penalty in the future. Emergency Non-Routine Petition, infra note 6, at 10.
3
Joe Burbank, Orange-Osceola State Attorney Says She Will No Longer Pursue Death Penalty in Any
Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/92813296-132.html.
4
Id. (quote transcribed from video).
5
Fla. Exec. Order No. 17-66 (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2017/
EO_17-66.pdf.
6
Emergency Non-Routine Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto at 11 n.16, Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.3d 755
(Fla. 2017) (No. SC17-653) (“Scott’s pick of . . . Brad King was not just based on the proximity of the Judicial
Circuits. King testified before the Florida Legislature in January 2016 against legislation that would require
unanimous juries in death penalty cases because he believed that unanimous juries made it too difficult to obtain
death sentences.”) (citation omitted); Dara Kam, Ayala’s Decision Spurs Debate on Death Penalty, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Mar. 27, 2017, 10:10 AM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/political-pulse/os-ayaladeath-penalty-debate-20170327-story.html.
7
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.14(1) (West 2014); Kam, supra note 6.
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action in court,8 seeking a writ of quo warranto from the Supreme Court of
Florida.9
The court first noted that it would apply a standard of review analogous to
abuse of discretion to Scott’s Executive Order.10 It then held that, because the
Executive Order was based on “Ayala’s blanket refusal to pursue the death
penalty in any case,” despite Florida law authorizing her to do so, the order was
not an abuse of the Governor’s discretion.11 In other words, Governor Scott
permissibly removed the case from Ayala’s office.12 After the ruling was handed
down, Ayala agreed to pursue the death penalty in future cases.13
The Florida statute, Ayala’s decision, and Governor Scott’s response present
an apt case study of the relationship between local prosecutors,14 state officials,15
and the laws that govern their interactions. Despite a near-universal
acknowledgment that local prosecutors possess a great degree of discretion in
deciding which cases to prosecute and which to dismiss, virtually every state has
a law that empowers the supersession of local prosecutors by state officials.16
Though few of these laws have ever actually been used to supersede local

8
Gal Tziperman Lotan, State Attorney Ayala Files Lawsuit Against Gov. Scott in Death Penalty Cases,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 11, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/osaramis-ayala-rick-scott-death-penalty-lawsuit-20170410-story.html.
9
Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.3d 755, 756 (Fla. 2017). A writ of quo warranto is “[a] common-law writ used
to inquire into the authority by which a public office is held . . . .” Quo Warranto, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
10
Ayala, 224 So.3d at 758.
11
Id. at 758. Ayala, however, argued that in her press conference, supra note 4, she acknowledged that
she was not refusing to ever seek the death penalty, merely that Loyd’s case did not merit it. Emergency NonRoutine Petition, supra note 6, at 10 (“. . . Ayala made clear that she had not uniformly ruled out seeking the
death penalty, and that, among other things, ‘[t]here may be cases, even active ones, that I think the death penalty
may be appropriate because of the egregiousness of the offense.’”).
12
Ayala, 224 So.3d at 759.
13
Monivette Cordeiro, State Attorney Aramis Ayala Agrees to Pursue Death Penalty in Future, ORLANDO
WEEKLY: BLOGGYTOWN (Sept. 2, 2017, 12:33 PM), https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2017/09/
02/state-attorney-aramis-ayala-agrees-to-pursue-death-penalty-in-future. Notwithstanding her previous
declaration “that she had not uniformly ruled out seeking the death penalty,” Emergency Non-Routine Petition,
supra note 6, at 10, Ayala created a “death penalty review panel,” made up of seven prosecutors who must
unanimously agree for her office to pursue the death penalty. Cordeiro, supra.
14
The term “local prosecutor” will be used in lieu of each state’s specific name for their local prosecutor,
given the lack of uniformity among the names. Depending on the state, a local prosecutor is called either a
commonwealth’s attorney, county attorney, county prosecutor, solicitor, district attorney, district attorney
general, prosecuting attorney, state attorney, or state’s attorney. GEORGE COPPOLO, STATES THAT ELECT THEIR
CHIEF PROSECUTORS (2003), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/rpt/2003-R-0231.htm.
15
“State official” usually refers to the Attorney General. However, the term can also refer to the
Governor, another state official, or a collective group of state actors, like a legislature or executive cabinet.
16
Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109
MICH. L. REV. 519, 545–50 (2011); see infra Part II.
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prosecutors,17 the point remains that, as long as they are on the books, they could
be used—and there is a risk that they will be used more often in the not-sodistant future. As liberal, urban communities increasingly elect reform-minded
prosecutors like Ayala, the criminal justice establishment likely will use
supersession with greater frequency, potentially challenging traditional notions
of prosecutorial discretion and democratic accountability.
This Comment explains the shift in public opinion that has led to the election
of reformist prosecutors and what this shift means practically for the balance of
power between state and local officials. It then presents a broad overview of
statutory regimes of supersession and advocates for the nationwide adoption of
a workable standard—specifically, an abuse of discretion standard modeled on
Pennsylvania’s current law—that respects both prosecutorial discretion and the
best interests of justice.
Part I begins by exploring recent trends in public opinion concerning
criminal justice and later explains how shifting public opinion can affect the
decisions made by local prosecutors. This Comment argues that, as public
opinion favors criminal justice reform over the “tough-on-crime” approach that
dominated from the 1960s through the 1990s, reform-minded prosecutors are
more likely to be elected now than in years past, especially in liberal, urban
areas. Further, this trend toward electing reformist prosecutors, who will enter
office with tendencies like those of Aramis Ayala, might provoke state officials’
usage of state laws enabling supersession.18
Next, Part II surveys the constitutions and statutes of all fifty states for
provisions pertaining to the discretion of local prosecutors and the ability of state
officials to supersede or direct them. Virtually all states have laws governing the
supersession or direction of local prosecutors by state officials (or, in some rare
cases, by local officials and even by members of the public) though it is
exceedingly rare that these laws are ever used or studied. This Comment makes
a meaningful scholastic contribution by organizing, for the first time, these
constitutional and statutory provisions into five discrete categories based on
common features. Within each category, these provisions are further subdivided,
depending on their statutory language and state court interpretations, if available.

17

Barkow, supra note 16, at 545.
Given that many of these newly-elected, reform-minded local prosecutors are winning elections in
liberal constituencies located in otherwise conservative states, this Comment assumes that the prosecutors in
question are generally more reform-minded than the statewide officials authorized to supersede them.
18
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Finally, Part III grapples with the problem identified in Part I and proposes
a solution. It suggests the adoption of a new model governing supersession and
direction to prevent the anticipated erosion of local prosecutorial discretion.
Specifically, this Comment advocates for a model permitting supersession of a
local prosecutor only if a court finds that her action or inaction constitutes an
abuse of discretion—in other words, a modified version of Pennsylvania’s
supersession statute.19 This Comment argues that the principles of democratic
accountability and the degree to which prosecutors and the criminal justice
system are insulated from political pressure favor a model that generally defers
to the discretion of local prosecutors.
I.

CHANGES IN PUBLIC OPINION AND PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

To get a sense of why reform-minded candidates like Aramis Ayala are
increasingly winning local prosecutorial elections, this Part begins by exploring
the dramatic shift in public opinion occurring over the last fifty years. Section A
briefly reviews the roots of “tough-on-crime” policies and explains why those
policies have fallen out of favor in the last decade. Section B provides several
case studies, focusing on various reformers elected in high-profile prosecutorial
elections. This Part concludes in section C by detailing some of the early actions
of these newly-elected prosecutors and the subsequent responses from the
“tough-on-crime” legal establishment.
A. Introduction and Overview
Americans began to favor harsher criminal justice policies starting in the
early 1960s, when crime rates first began to rise.20 While some crime statistics
were deliberately exaggerated for political purposes,21 public opinion
dramatically shifted as a result. A backlash to the events of the 1960s and
1970s—including the nascent Civil Rights Movement,22 the Warren Court’s
liberal criminal justice decisions that “restricted the authority of the police” and

19

Infra notes 172–73, 183–86 and accompanying text.
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 111 (Jeremy Travis & Bruce Western eds., 2014).
21
See id. at 114 (“For example, [U.S. Attorney General] Nicholas Katzenbach . . . maintained that the
crime figures were inconclusive and that false information about crime often intimidated or misled the general
public.”).
22
Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime Movement
Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y
3, 10–11 (2013).
20
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were considered “soft on crime,”23 the era’s protest culture,24 and a growing
perception of social disorder and lawlessness25—pushed many Americans to
favor “tough-on-crime” policies,26 even as the rate of crime decreased in the
1990s.27
This public opinion shift advantaged presidential candidates who
successfully tapped into this public discontent, like Richard Nixon and Ronald
Reagan,28 and soon the federal government forcefully responded to the
perception of lawlessness. President Nixon launched the “War on Drugs” in
1971.29 This was followed by, among other things, the creation of strict
mandatory minimums for drug crimes,30 the passage of “three strikes” laws,31
the emergence of legislative schemes to try minor criminal defendants as
adults,32 and an overall rise in incarceration.33
But since the Obama administration, public support for “tough-on-crime”
policies has sharply decreased and pressure for reform has increased. Recent
polling shows that Americans favor reduced sentences for drug offenders, an
end to mandatory minimum sentencing, and a focus on rehabilitation instead of
incarceration.34 While it is difficult to isolate just one factor to explain or
demonstrate this shift in public opinion, some of the most influential forces have
been the Black Lives Matter movement,35 the successful state-level campaigns

23

NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 114–15.
Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2010) (“To a certain extent, popular anxiety about social disorganization
reflected numerous nonracial factors, whether the economy, protests against the Viet Nam war, political
mobilization on college campuses, the counter-culture movement generally, or the sense of social crisis
engendered for many by the demands for women’s and gay rights.”)
25
Id.
26
Newell, supra note 22, at 12.
27
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 111; Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing
Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 569 (2007).
28
Newell, supra note 22, at 14–18.
29
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 119.
30
See id.
31
See generally JENNIFER E. WALSH, THREE STRIKES LAWS: HISTORICAL GUIDES TO CONTROVERSIAL
ISSUES IN AMERICA 31–54 (2007).
32
See Katherine L. Evans, Comment, Trying Juveniles as Adults: Is the Short Term Gain of Retribution
Outweighed by the Long Term Effects on Society?, 62 MISS. L.J. 95, 100–07 (1992).
33
Haney López, supra note 24, at 1029–30.
34
See Voters Want Big Changes in Federal Sentencing, Prison System, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 12,
2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2016/02/12/voters-want-changes-in-federal
-sentencing-prison-system.
35
Gardiner Harris, Obama, Pushing Criminal Justice Reform, Defends ‘Black Lives Matter’, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/us/politics/obama-in-call-for-reform-defends-the-blacklives-matter-movement.html.
24
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to legalize cannabis,36 increased opposition to the death penalty,37 recordbreaking rates of incarceration,38 and an overall decrease in crime in recent
decades.39 Today, politicians are increasingly comfortable supporting criminal
justice reform at the expense of “tough-on-crime” policies,40 and the rhetoric of
these newfound reformers is remarkably similar to the rhetoric of liberals in the
1960s who first responded to the “War on Crime.”41 Some conservatives have
also advocated for criminal justice reform, but have used rhetoric that
emphasizes fiscal conservatism rather than concepts of fairness or justice.42 The
dramatic shift in public opinion—coupled with the change in elected officials’
rhetoric—has led to a number of interesting trends in elections, most notably in
local prosecutorial elections.
B. Electoral Consequences of the Shift in Public Opinion
In recent years, criminal justice reform has played a large role in elections at
every level—including municipal elections,43 sheriff elections,44 state
36
Abigail Geiger, About Six-in-Ten Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 5,
2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/05/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/. The term
“marijuana” likely originated “to demonize the drug with a foreign-sounding name,” playing on American
xenophobic sentiment. SPANISH WORD HISTORIES AND MYSTERIES: ENGLISH WORDS THAT COME FROM
SPANISH 142 (Editors of the American Heritage Dictionaries ed., 2007). Accordingly, this Comment uses the
term “cannabis.”
37
German Lopez, Opposition to the Death Penalty Is at Its Highest Point Since 1972, VOX (Oct. 1, 2016,
10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/10/1/13123620/death-penalty-survey.
38
Haney López, supra note 24, at 1029–30.
39
Matt Ford, What Caused the Great Crime Decline in the U.S.?, ATLANTIC (April 15, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/what-caused-the-crime-decline/477408/.
40
See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
41
Generally, liberals treated rising crime as a “race and civil rights problem, suggesting that entrenched
segregation had created black cultural dysfunction and social disorder that, among other things, contributed to
higher crime rates in urban areas.” NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 114. In his initial response to increased
crime, President Lyndon Johnson linked the “War on Crime” to the “War on Poverty” and the “need to address
the ‘root causes’ of crime.” Id. at 109. Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the 1968 Democratic nominee for
President, pledged to “build a new school for every new prison promised by Nixon,” citing the relationship
between poverty and crime. Newell, supra note 22, at 16.
42
Richard A. Viguerie, Opinion, A Conservative Case for Prison Reform, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/opinion/a-conservative-case-for-prison-reform.html.
43
E.g., Daniel Denvir, How #BlackLivesMatter Is Changing the Philadelphia Mayor’s Race, CITYLAB
(May 13, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/05/how-blacklivesmatter-is-changing-the-philadelphiamayors-race/392978/ (noting that in the Philadelphia mayoral race, the leading candidates positioned themselves
as criminal justice reformers, despite mixed records).
44
David A. Graham, Incumbents Are Out and a New Democrat Is In, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/grassroots-criminal-justice-in-north-carolina/560015/
(noting that two North Carolina sheriffs—Irwin Carmichael in Charlotte and Mike Andrews in Durham—lost
re-election in part because of their “‘friendly’ relationship with Immigration and Customs Enforcement”).
Historically, elections for sheriff have not served as a “meaningful accountability mechanism” on sheriffs’
powers, in part because of low voter turnout, high incumbent retention, and sheriffs’ lack of engagement with
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elections,45 and the 2016 Democratic presidential primary.46 But the most
interesting and relevant trend for this Comment is the success of criminal justice
reformers in local prosecutorial elections. Voters, especially those in liberal,
urban communities, have increasingly elected reform-minded prosecutors to
replace “tough-on-crime” incumbents. This section examines some of the most
high-profile prosecutorial elections, focusing on the winning candidates’
campaigns, their actions in office, and the response by the more traditional,
“tough-on-crime” legal establishment.
Reform-minded prosecutors across the United States usually campaign as
“true believers” of criminal justice reform, but with varying degrees of
consistency and radicalism. Marilyn Mosby, for example, was elected Baltimore
City state’s attorney in 2014 on a “reform-lite” platform.47 She blended support
for police accountability and civil rights48 with more traditional, “tough on
crime” rhetoric.49
Other successful challengers were more vocal in their support for criminal
justice reform. Following the shooting of Laquan McDonald in Chicago, Black
Lives Matter activists criticized Cook County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez
for waiting 13 months to bring charges against the officer who shot him.50 Kim
Foxx subsequently ran against Alvarez in the 2016 Democratic primary as a

their communities. James Tomberlin, Note, “Don’t Elect Me”: Sheriffs and the Need for Reform in County Law
Enforcement, 104 VA. L. REV. 113, 142–44 (2018). But despite this historical trend, elections for sheriff “seem
to be part of a grassroots push for criminal-justice reform at the local ballot box,” with several prominent sheriffs
losing re-election. David A. Graham, The End of the David Clarke Era, ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/david-clarke-era-milwaukee-sheriff/567595/.
45
E.g., Christopher Cadelago, California Gubernatorial Candidates Share Views on Criminal Justice
Changes, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 4, 2017, 5:02 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/
capitol-alert/article142719649.html (noting that the leading Democratic candidates for Governor of California
campaigned on their criminal justice reform platforms).
46
Vanessa Williams, 1994 Crime Bill Haunts Clinton and Sanders as Criminal Justice Reform Rises to
Top in Democratic Contest, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2016, 6:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2016/02/12/1994-crime-bill-haunts-clinton-and-sanders-as-criminal-justice-reform-rises-totop-in-democratic-contest/?utm_term=.f30570652b4f.
47
See Luke Broadwater, Mosby’s Focus on Crime Helped Unseat Bernstein, BALT. SUN (June 25, 2014,
8:38 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/bs-md-ci-mosby-analysis-20140625-story.html.
48
Elizabeth Chuck, Meet Marilyn Mosby, the Woman Overseeing the Gray Investigation, MSNBC
(Apr. 30, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/meet-marilyn-mosby-overseeing-freddie-grayinvestigation.
49
Ian Duncan, Four Years in, Bernstein in Primary Fight for Re-election with Mosby, BALT. SUN
(June 14, 2014, 9:38 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-statesattorney-election-20140613-story.html.
50
Kim Bellware, Black Lives Matter Movement Notches Major Win in Chicago Race, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 15, 2016, 9:43 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kim-foxx-chicago_us_56e8a607e4b065e2e3d
7cd65.
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progressive challenger.51 She altered Mosby’s playbook by dropping any
pretense of being a “tough-on-crime” candidate.52 Foxx instead campaigned on
“diverting low level drug offenders into treatment,” reversing wrongful
convictions, prosecuting police brutality, and ending the practice of charging
students for schoolyard fights.53 Alvarez, meanwhile, claimed the “tough-oncrime” mantle for herself.54 Foxx ended up easily defeating Alvarez in a nearly
thirty-point landslide.55 Kim Ogg, the Democratic nominee for District Attorney
in Houston the same year, followed Foxx’s lead and centered her campaign on
a pledge to not prosecute low-level cannabis possession charges.56 Ogg’s victory
in the general election was striking, given that her Republican opponent, the
incumbent prosecutor, had already relaxed the criminal prosecution of first-time
drug offenders.57
Larry Krasner, who was elected Philadelphia District Attorney in 2017, built
on the successes of reformers in other municipalities and proposed an even more
radical platform. He pledged to not pursue the death penalty, to not seek cash
bail for “nonviolent offenders,” to emphasize diversion programs and drug
courts, and “to end mass incarceration by effectively starving the criminaljustice system” of defendants.58 Krasner’s campaign promises concerned the
city’s police union, which opposed his candidacy and instead supported his
Republican opponent.59
In each of these four instances, the newly-elected reformers made good on
their promises while in office. In Baltimore, after the death of Freddie Gray in
the custody of the city police department, Marilyn Mosby swiftly—and
51
John Byrne & Hal Dardick, Foxx: Cook County State’s Attorney Win About ‘Turning the Page’, CHI.
TRIB. (Mar. 16, 2016, 7:05 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-cook-county-statesattorney-anita-alvarez-kim-foxx-met-0316-20160315-story.html.
52
See id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Brian Rogers et al., Anderson Defeated in Harris County DA Race, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 8, 2016, 10:40
PM),
https://www.chron.com/news/politics/houston/article/Anderson-defeated-in-Harris-County-DA-race10602957.php; Brian Rogers, DA Hopeful Would Reduce Drug Penalties, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/DA-hopeful-would-reduce-drugpenalties-6770424.php.
57
Rogers, Anderson Defeated in Harris County DA Race, supra note 56.
58
Maura Ewing, The Progressive Civil-Rights Lawyer Philadelphia Wants for District Attorney,
ATLANTIC (May 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/philadelphia-district-attorneyelection-reform/526812/.
59
Chris Brennan, If Krasner Wins Race for DA, Fans and Critics Expect Disruption, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Oct. 25, 2017, 3:01 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/philadelphia-da-krasner-policemisconduct-crime-soros-20171024.html.
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controversially—charged the responsible police officers with manslaughter.60
Kim Foxx implemented bail reform and worked to end over charging of
defendants in Chicago.61 And in Houston, Kim Ogg allowed those caught with
small amounts of cannabis “the chance to take a drug education class instead of
being arrested.”62
Larry Krasner, the recently-elected Philadelphia district attorney, has
pursued the boldest reforms of the four. Within a month of his inauguration, he
indicated that he would end his office’s twenty-year trend of refraining from
prosecuting police officers for fatal shootings,63 fired thirty-one prosecutors and
brought in like-minded reformers,64 dropped all pending cannabis possession
charges,65 and directed his prosecutors to justify the cost of incarceration when
pursuing it at sentencing.66
This transformation in prosecutorial behavior runs hand in hand with a
changing formula for success in local prosecutorial elections. The tone and
talking points of many prosecutors’ campaigns indicate that they increasingly
60
Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, 6 Baltimore Police Officers Charged in Freddie Gray Death,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/us/freddie-gray-autopsy-report-given-tobaltimore-prosecutors.html. Despite Mosby’s efforts, however, the officers were ultimately found not guilty on
all counts, and they did not face federal charges, either. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Baltimore Officers Will Face No
Federal Charges in Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/
us/freddie-gray-baltimore-police-federal-charges.html.
61
Curtis Black, Where Does Criminal Justice Reform Stand One Year After Kim Foxx Elected?, CHI.
REP. (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.chicagoreporter.com/where-does-criminal-justice-reform-stand-one-year-afterkim-foxx-elected/. These changes notwithstanding, some activists have argued that Foxx has not moved quickly
enough to implement her campaign promises. Id.
62
Tom Dart, Houston’s New District Attorney Stands by Her Bold Move to Decriminalize Marijuana,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/18/houston-districtattorney-kim-ogg-marijuana-decriminalization-texas.
63
Mensah M. Dean, DA Krasner on Lack of Charges in Police Shootings: ‘This Ain’t Fair, This is
Biased’, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 12, 2018, 5:31 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/da-krasner-onlack-of-charges-in-police-shootings-this-aint-fair-this-is-a-bias-20180112.html.
64
See Phillip Jackson, Larry Krasner Introduces New Leadership Team, PHILA. TRIB. (Jan. 9, 2018),
http://www.phillytrib.com/news/larry-krasner-introduces-new-leadership-team/article_245b3386-1317-56278dbd-95762789dc5f.html; Chris Palmer et al., Krasner Dismisses 31 from Philly DA’s Office in Dramatic FirstWeek Shakeup, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 5, 2018, 7:51 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/larrykrasner-philly-da-firing-prosecutors-20180105.html; Chris Palmer, Provocative Police Critic on DA-Elect
Krasner’s Transition Team, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 30, 2017, 4:57 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/
crime/provocative-police-critic-on-da-elect-krasners-transition-team-20171130.html.
65
Joe Trinacria, Larry Krasner Sues Big Pharma, Drops All Marijuana Possession Charges, PHILA.
MAG. (Feb. 16, 2018, 9:17 AM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2018/02/16/krasner-big-pharma-marijuanapossession/.
66
Chris Palmer, In Latest Edict, Philly DA Larry Krasner Tells Prosecutors to Seek Lighter Sentences,
Estimate Costs of Incarceration, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 15, 2018, 5:13 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/
news/crime/philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-plea-deals-shorter-sentences-cost-of-massincarceration-20180315.html.
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recognize the popularity of criminal justice reform among their constituents.
While previous candidates would brag about their conviction rates and “tough
on crime” credentials,67 a successful candidate today speaks passionately about
the need for fundamental criminal justice reform.68
Countless other successes—including Raul Torrez in Albuquerque, Michael
O’Malley in Cleveland, Mark Gonzalez in Corpus Christi, Satana Deberry in
Durham, Robert Shuler Smith in Jackson, Aramis Ayala in Orlando, James
Stewart in Shreveport, Kim Gardner in the City of St. Louis, Wesley Bell in St.
Louis County, Andrew Warren in Tampa, and even Scott Colom in the small
town of Columbus, Mississippi—indicate a sea change in prosecutorial
elections.69 And the change in the tide has not been solely restricted to
Democratic primaries in liberal constituencies. Even in Florida’s Fourth Judicial
Circuit, which includes the city of Jacksonville and its conservative suburbs, the
incumbent “tough-on-crime” prosecutor lost her bid for re-election in the
Republican primary, largely due to her overly aggressive prosecutorial
approach.70
The success of reformers in these elections has been especially striking given
that local prosecutorial elections have historically generated little interest or

67

See Ann Chih Lin, The Troubled Success of Crime Policy, in THE SOCIAL DIVIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES
312, 312–13 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998).
68
Consider, for example, the race to replace the late Ken Thompson as Brooklyn district attorney. The
candidates in the Democratic primary each attempted to out-position each other as the best-equipped to take on
the task of criminal justice reform, supporting efforts to review wrongful convictions, punish police brutality,
end the cash bail system, and not prosecute prostitution or turnstile jumping. See Beth Fertig, In Brooklyn District
Attorney Race, a Different Kind of Law-and-Order, WNYC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.wnyc.org/story/
brooklyn-district-attorney-candidates-compete-whos-most-progressive/.
69
Scott Bland, George Soros’ Quiet Overhaul of the U.S. Justice System, POLITICO (Aug. 30, 2016, 5:25
AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/george-soros-criminal-justice-reform-227519;
Maurice
Chammah, New Strategy for Justice Reform: Vote Out the DA, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/10/18/new-strategy-for-justice-reform-vote-out-the-da;
Graham,
Incumbents Are Out, supra note 44; Joshua Gunter, Michael O’Malley topples Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Timothy McGinty, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:39 AM), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/
2016/03/michael_omalley_topples_cuyaho_1.html; Astead W. Herndon, Wesley Bell, Ferguson Councilman,
Unseats St. Louis County Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/us/
politics/wesley-bell-st-louis-election-result.html; Kira Lerner, Overzealous Prosecutors Are Losing Elections,
THINKPROGRESS (Sep. 1, 2016, 6:55 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/overzealous-prosecutors-are-losingelections-6dad096118e1/. For a more detailed look at local prosecutorial elections, see generally David Alan
Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647 (2017)
(surveying recent prosecutorial elections in which voters have been turning away from “tough-on-crime”
prosecutors, and exploring the possible consequences of this change for the criminal justice system).
70
Andrew Pantazi, What Does Angela Corey’s Loss Say About the Changing Politics of Prosecution?,
FLA. TIMES-UNION (Sept. 2, 2016, 7:19 PM), http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2016-09-02/story/what-doesangela-coreys-loss-say-about-changing-politics-prosecution.
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controversy.71 In a reflection of the new status quo, however, these elections will
likely continue to be fruitful opportunities for criminal justice reformers—albeit
accompanied by new challenges, different opponents, and at least occasional
failures along the way.72
C. Predictions for the Future
The energy generated by the Black Lives Matter movement, coupled with
external financial support from liberal donors, is unlikely to abate in the coming
years. Much of the success of reformers in prosecutorial elections has been due
to the intervention of wealthy campaign contributors and third-party campaign
groups, like the ones funded by well-known Democratic donor George Soros.
His groups have spent millions of dollars in Florida, Illinois, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, and Texas to successfully elect reformers.73 Other
wealthy donors—such as Fred Eychaner—have donated hundreds of thousands
of dollars directly to reform-minded candidates, like Foxx in Chicago.74 These
independent groups have continued to invest heavily in these races; their most
recent effort, supporting Larry Krasner75 in his successful 2017 campaign for
Philadelphia District Attorney,76 is unlikely to be their last. Additionally, as
reformers like Aramis Ayala and Marilyn Mosby generate controversy, reelecting them will likely require vigorous campaigns.77 As the Tea Party
71
See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 592–93 (2009)
(noting that prosecutors are re-elected 95% of the time and are entirely unopposed 85% of the time).
72
Indeed, in several recent prosecutorial elections targeted by criminal justice reformers—including
Alameda, Sacramento, and San Diego Counties in California, and Bennington County in Vermont—the reformminded challengers fell short as incumbent prosecutors were re-elected. Jim Therrien, Marthage, Schmidt Fend
Off Challengers in Primary, BENNINGTON BANNER, https://www.benningtonbanner.com/stories/marthageschmidt-apparent-primary-winners,547648 (last updated Aug. 15, 2018, 2:15 PM); Abbie Vansickle & Paige St.
John, Big Spending by George Soros and Liberal Groups Fails to Sway D.A. Races in California, L.A. TIMES
(June 6, 2018, 9:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-da-election-soros-20180606-story.
html.
73
Bland, supra note 69.
74
Byrne & Dardick, supra note 51.
75
Chris Brennan, $1.45 Million Soros Investment in Philly DA’s Race Draws Heat for Krasner, PHILA.
INQUIRER (May 5, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/Soros-145-million-investment-in-Dasrace-draws-heat-for-Krasner.html.
76
Supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
77
During Mosby’s reelection campaign in 2018, her two opponents attacked her for both a lack of
convictions and for an alleged inconsistency between her rhetoric as a criminal justice reformer and the actions
of her office. Justin Fenton, Field Set in Baltimore State’s Attorney’s Race as Mosby, Challengers File, BALT.
SUN (Feb. 27, 2018, 7:50 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-sao-candidatesfile-20180227-story.html. One opponent, Thiru Vignarajah, said that, if elected, “his office [would] stop
prosecuting victims of addiction for petty offenses, support immigrants and oppose mandatory minimum
sentences.” Id. Ultimately, Mosby handily won the Democratic primary over her two opponents, effectively
assuring her re-election with no opponent in the general election. Tim Prudente, Marilyn Mosby Wins Re-
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movement showed, electoral success begets electoral success;78 as an
ideological movement gains more and more support following elections, energy
for the movement grows and it sees even more success.
Indeed, the drive for criminal justice reform and police accountability has
now joined the mainstream of American politics. Politicians and candidates are
becoming less cautious about speaking out on these issues.79 Though some
Republicans and conservative activists have spoken out about police brutality
and the need for reform,80 most of the movement on these issues has come from
Democratic politicians.81 This movement has real consequences for shaping
public opinion and galvanizing the base of liberal American voters: as
Democratic political elites bring issues into the mainstream and frame their
positions on them, voters warm to those positions and follow suit.82
Admittedly, the election of reformers as local prosecutors does not directly
affect the legal structure of the prosecutorial discretion regime. But the
anticipated response by state governments, especially in the form of
supersession, may impose some new de facto limits on prosecutorial discretion.
Under the current statutory regimes, cases of supersession have been

Election in Three-Way Race for Baltimore State’s Attorney, BALT. SUN (June 26, 2018, 4:30 PM), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-ci-states-attorney-20180625-story.html. And though Ayala’s
next election is two years away, a Republican candidate has already filed to run against her. Steven Lemongello,
Republican Attorney Announces 2020 Run Against State Attorney Aramis Ayala, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 20,
2017, 12:00 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/political-pulse/os-kevin-morenski-ken-lewisayala-20170320-story.html.
78
See Tom Cohen, 5 Years Later, Here’s How the Tea Party Changed Politics, CNN (Feb. 28, 2014,
1:17 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/politics/tea-party-greatest-hits/index.html.
79
See, e.g., Carol E. Lee, Democratic Convention Tackles Issues of Violence and Police, WALL STREET
J. (July 26, 2016, 11:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democratic-convention-tackles-issues-of-violenceand-police-1469578101.
80
Supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81
See Lee, supra note 79. Much of this difference can be explained by the increasingly close relationship
between the Republican Party and police unions, the Republican base’s confidence in the police, and cues from
national Republican politicians, like Donald Trump, that claims of police brutality are overstated. Anna Brown,
Republicans More Likely than Democrats to Have Confidence in Police; PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Jan. 13,
2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/republicans-more-likely-than-democrats-to-haveconfidence-in-police/; Eleanor Clift, The GOP and Police Unions: A Love Story, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 12, 2014,
5:45 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-gop-and-police-unions-a-love-story; Cleve R. Wootson, Jr. &
Mark Berman, U.S. Police Chiefs Blast Trump for Endorsing ‘Police Brutality’, WASH. POST (July 29, 2017,
7:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/07/29/u-s-police-chiefs-blast-trumpfor-endorsing-police-brutality/?utm_term=.d9a4386b9836.
82
GABRIEL S. LENZ, FOLLOW THE LEADER?: HOW VOTERS RESPOND TO POLITICIANS’ POLICIES AND
PERFORMANCE 185 (2012) (noting that political science research shows citizens “adopt the policy views of their
preferred party or candidate”).
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exceedingly rare83: local prosecutors and statewide officials appear to have
developed an equilibrium over the last half-century, which explains the
historically low rate of supersession.84 However, this equilibrium is likely based
on an implicitly-agreed upon set of mutual expectations: state officials expect
that local prosecutors will vigorously enforce the laws passed by the state
legislature, and local prosecutors expect that, in all but the rarest cases, their
discretion will not be superseded.85 But those expectations will undergo stress
as reformers—especially those who opt to refrain altogether from prosecuting
certain crimes86 or seeking certain punishments87—come into office.
As more reformers are elected—especially in liberal municipalities of
otherwise conservative states—laws allowing supersession may be used with
increasing frequency whenever they are available. And when supersession is
unavailable, less direct methods of curtailing prosecutorial discretion will be
used. For example, the state government’s aggressive response to Aramis
Ayala’s refusal to seek the death penalty, including the Governor’s reassignment
of her office’s homicide cases,88 the legislature’s slashing of her office’s budget
by $1.3 million,89 and calls from legislators for Governor Scott to remove her
from office;90 the condemnation of Kim Ogg’s refusal to prosecute low-level
cannabis possession;91 and the litigation surrounding Hinds County District
Attorney Robert Shuler Smith, which included the Mississippi Attorney General
suing to supersede in one of Smith’s cases92 as well as Smith’s criminal
83
Barkow, supra note 16, at 550. However, data is not readily available—and is likely not even kept by
states—on how often supersession occurs. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
84
See Barkow, supra note 16, at 550.
85
In the absence of data regarding instances of supersession, the relatively few court cases directly
involving challenges of supersession, infra Part II, provide support for the conclusion that supersession is
historically rare.
86
Dart, supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing Houston prosecutor Kim Ogg’s refusal to
prosecute low-level marijuana possession charges).
87
Burbank, supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Orlando prosecutor Aramis Ayala’s refusal
to seek the death penalty in homicide cases).
88
Supra note 5.
89
Renata Sago, Ayala’s Office Operating with $1.3M Budget Cut in Rift Over Death Penalty, WMFE
(July 12, 2017), http://www.wmfe.org/ayalas-office-operates-with-1-3m-budget-cut-over-death-penalty-rift/
75487.
90
Dara Kam & Jim Turner, Backroom Briefing: Black Lawmakers Back Aramis Ayala, SUNSHINE ST.
NEWS (Mar. 23, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://sunshinestatenews.com/story/backroom-briefing-black-lawmakersback-aramis-ayala.
91
Sanya Mansoor, New Harris County Policy Reignites Marijuana Decriminalization Debate, TEX. TRIB.
(Feb. 16, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/02/16/texas-lawmakers-disagree-houston-movesdecriminalize-marijuana/; Mike Ward, Patrick Blasts Ogg’s Pot Policy, but Other Lawmakers More Supportive,
HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 16, 2017, 4:28 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Patrick-opposesOgg-s-marijuana-rule-other-10937974.php.
92
Williams v. State, 184 So.3d 908, 909 (Miss. 2014).
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prosecution for allegedly undermining a criminal drug case,93 all indicate a
willingness by the more traditional, “tough-on-crime” establishment to
forcefully respond to disfavored (and mostly liberal) exercises of prosecutorial
discretion.94
While prosecutorial discretion is criticized by some scholars as enabling
discrimination,95 discretion allows and encourages prosecutors in the United
States to look beyond mere legal sufficiency as a filing standard. Instead,
prosecutors are empowered to consider substantive justice factors. Prosecutors
in most municipalities either decline to prosecute or drop charges in about a
quarter of the cases brought to them by the police.96 Unduly infringing on
prosecutorial discretion, as supporters of supersession would, could have the
adverse effect of pushing even more cases into our already-overcrowded
criminal justice system.97 The transition from our current regime to one without
meaningful prosecutorial discretion will likely happen subtly. As discretion is
devalued and supersession normalized by one set of actors, the norm disfavoring
the disruption of prosecutorial discretion will erode for all actors, rendering
prosecutorial discretion a forceless, hollow maxim to which our legal system
would pay mere lip service.
To understand why this is likely—and how statutory changes can prevent
this oncoming storm—we must understand the different state models governing
supersession.
II. A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY: FIVE MODELS OF PROSECUTORIAL
SUPERSESSION
As an initial matter, “supersession” must be defined for the purposes of this
Part. Defined herein, supersession can occur in two different ways. First, a state

93
Justin Vicory, Hinds DA Robert Shuler Smith Not Guilty on All Counts, CLARION-LEDGER (Aug. 8,
2017,
4:22
PM),
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/local/2017/08/08/hinds-county-da-jurydeliberations/550536001/.
94
Depending on the state, this “establishment” could include the governor, attorney general, legislature,
cabinet, or judges. See infra Part II.
95
DeMay, infra note 228 at 772.
96
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL
TABLES 22 (Dec. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.
97
See K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened
Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 291–96 (2014) (noting the harms of an overburdened
justice system, specifically that “trials are delayed and innocent people, particularly those who are incarcerated,
are likely to plead guilty in exchange for their freedom”).
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official98 serving in a de facto supervisory role can direct a local prosecutor to
take an action in a criminal case, which includes bringing a criminal case if one
does not already exist, as well as dropping charges that a local prosecutor has
already filed. Second, a state official can remove a local prosecutor from a case
and reassign it to someone else, including the state official herself.
It is also necessary to consider what supersession is not. Supersession does
not refer to an instance in which a state official initiates a prosecution based on
her independent power to prosecute, even when a local prosecutor has decided
not to pursue a case.99 While an exercise of independent power to prosecute may
have some of the same practical effects as supersession from a criminal
defendant’s point of view, supersession in this Comment necessarily implicates
the displacement or direction of a local prosecutor. In essence, the prosecutorial
discretion of a local prosecutor must be overruled for a state official’s action to
function as supersession.
With that in mind, there are five different models of prosecutorial
supersession:
A. States where a state official can supersede a local prosecutor in all
cases.

98
Each state with a supersession statute or constitutional provision on point designates at least one state
official by statute or constitutional provision with the power to override any prosecutor’s discretion. This state
official is usually the attorney general but can also be the governor or, less commonly, a judge, an executive
cabinet, or a legislature. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
99
Most states grant their attorney general at least some independent power to initiate a criminal
prosecution, even if only in a set of limited circumstances. Barkow, supra note 16, at 545–51. Several states
grant their attorney general common law powers, which two states—Arkansas and Illinois—have interpreted to
include the power to initiate criminal prosecutions that existed at common law. Arkansas statutes expressly note
that the attorney general has “duties . . . under the common law,” ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-16-703 to -706 (West
Supp. 2018), and the state supreme court has held that these duties included prosecution. State ex rel. Williams
v. Karston, 187 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ark. 1945). Beyond this grant of power, no Arkansas state official has any
power to supersede a local prosecutor.
Similarly, the Illinois state constitution states that the attorney general “shall have the duties and powers
that may be prescribed by law,” ILL. CONST. art. V, § 15, which also includes the power to initiate prosecutions.
People v. Buffalo Confectionary Co., 401 N.E.2d 546, 549 (Ill. 1980) (citing People v. Massarella, 382 N.E.2d
262 (Ill. 1978)). However, this power is “exercised concurrently with the . . . [county’s] State’s Attorney,” id.,
and cannot be used to “usurp[]” the State’s Attorney “to take exclusive charge of the prosecution.” People v.
Flynn, 31 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ill. 1940). But the mere fact that a state grants its attorney general common law
duties and powers does not mean that she can cite those powers to supersede a local prosecutor. For example,
the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the state attorney general’s attempt to take control of a local criminal
prosecution from a county prosecutor in 1996, finding that the attorney general’s common law powers did not
enable him to “assert[] dominion and control over the case[].” Newman v. Lance, 922 P.2d 395, 396–98, 401
(Idaho 1996).
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B. States where a state official can supersede local prosecutors when it
is in the public interest or in the interest of justice.
C. States where the state official can supersede local prosecutors when
requested to do so by either another state official or members of the
public.
D. States where the state official can supersede the local prosecutor if
she refuses to (or does not) enforce the law.
E. States where a local prosecutor can be superseded with the approval
of a court (or an independent commission).
All five models share a common objective: opening an escape valve to grant
a state actor the ability to check local prosecutors’ exercise of discretion. This
institutional design feature takes its cue from our federal system, which seeks to
“control the abuses of government.”100 All judicial and political actors at all
levels possess necessarily limited power within their respective jurisdictions,
and all are subject to constraints imposed by other actors. Put simply, all five
models represent different ways of calibrating the power balance between local
prosecutors and state officials.
Many states do not fit into just one category and instead have statutory
schemes that are best categorized as belonging to multiple models.101 This Part
analyzes each model in turn with the understanding that each model is not
entirely internally consistent—some models encompass a spectrum of liberal or
conservative constructions of the relevant statutes.

100

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
In Washington, for example, the attorney general may supersede the discretion of local prosecutors in
two different ways, which can be categorized as belonging to three different models. If the attorney general
believes “that the criminal laws are being improperly enforced in any county, and that the prosecuting attorney
of the county has failed or neglected to institute and prosecute violations of such criminal laws,” she may “direct
the prosecuting attorney to take such action in connection with any prosecution as the attorney general
determines to be necessary and proper.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.090 (West 2018). If the prosecuting
attorney refuses to do so, the attorney general can take over the prosecution herself. Id. Additionally, the attorney
general may initiate and conduct prosecutions if requested to do so by the prosecuting attorney where the crime
happened, the governor, or by a majority of the committee overseeing the state patrol’s organized crime
intelligence unit. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.232 (West 2018). This statutory scheme, therefore, fits into
three discrete models, namely, Groups A, C, and D. See infra Sections II.A., II.C., II.D.
101
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A. States Where a State Official Can Supersede a Local Prosecutor in All
Cases
Though states within this model theoretically grant their local prosecutors
discretion, there are no barriers whatsoever for a state official who wishes to
supersede a local prosecutor. This model takes three distinct forms, which this
section will discuss in turn. In the first, a state official handles all criminal
prosecutions herself, and prosecutorial discretion is nonexistent. In the second,
a state official serves as the “supervisor” of independently-elected local
prosecutors and can order them to take a particular action, effectively resulting
in no discretion. And in the third, a state official can supersede a local prosecutor
for any reason.
First, in three states—Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island—there is no local
prosecutorial discretion because a statewide officer directs all criminal
prosecutions. In Alaska and Rhode Island, the attorney general’s office handles
all criminal prosecutions directly,102 and in Delaware, the attorney general
appoints a state prosecutor, who is directly answerable to the attorney general.103
It would thus be redundant to elect local prosecutors in these states, and
unsurprisingly, none does. While the Alaska attorney general appoints district
attorneys who operate within the attorney general’s office,104 there are no
comparable positions in Delaware or Rhode Island.105 Any local prosecutors,
therefore, serve at the will of the statewide officer, and enjoy no statutorilyguaranteed discretion at all.
Second, in Montana, New Hampshire, and Washington, the state attorney
general serves as the “supervisor” of local prosecutors, and can order them to
take particular actions, at least in some circumstances. Though many other states

102

ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.23.020(b)(4) (West Supp. 2018); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-9-4 (West

2014).
103

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2505(c) (West Supp. 2018).
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.17.010, 040 (West 2007). Though neither the Constitution of Alaska nor
Alaska Statutes explicitly give the Attorney General the power to appoint District Attorneys, State v. Breeze,
873 P.2d 627, 633 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994), her power to do so is implicit and regularly exercised, Press Release,
Alaska Attorney General, Attorney General Appoints New Bethel DA (July 18, 2017).
105
Given that Delaware and Rhode Island are the two smallest states by total land area and have the
smallest number of counties, it is not surprising that local prosecutors are neither elected by nor appointed to
counties. Indeed, county power in Delaware is limited, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 330 (West Supp. 2018), and
is nonexistent altogether in Rhode Island, Clyde F. Snider, American County Government: A Mid-Century
Review, 46 AM. POL. SCI. R. 66, 66 (1952). What is surprising, however, is that other small states with
nonexistent—or very weak—county governments, such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, do
have local prosecutors elected by or appointed to counties. See infra notes 108–09, 128, 178 and accompanying
text.
104
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explicitly reject the notion that local prosecutors, especially elected local
prosecutors, operate within a “chain-of-command,” these three states embrace
it.106
Montana and New Hampshire both grant their attorneys general broad
powers to supervise local prosecutors. Montana requires its local prosecutors to
“promptly institute and diligently prosecute” criminal cases “when ordered or
directed by the attorney general,”107 while New Hampshire law similarly notes
that county attorneys are “under the direction of the attorney general”108 and
“shall be subject to” her control “whenever in [her] discretion [s]he shall see fit
to exercise” it.109 Washington, however, does not position its local prosecutors
quite as subserviently as do Montana and New Hampshire. The attorney general
only has the ability to give a local prosecutor an order when the attorney general
concludes that “the criminal laws are being improperly enforced” in a county
and “that the prosecuting attorney of the county has failed or neglected to
institute and prosecute violations of such criminal laws, either generally or with
regard to a specific offense or class of offenses.”110 In such a case, the attorney
general “shall direct the prosecuting attorney to take such action in connection
with any prosecution as the attorney general determines to be necessary and
proper.”111 If the local prosecutor fails to do so, the attorney general may then
take over the case.112
Third, some states allow state officials to supersede local prosecutors for any
reason. Though each state within this subcategory frames its statute slightly
differently, all share common traits. Four of the five states—Alabama, Arizona,
Maine, and Nevada—attach superficial, weak preconditions on supersession by
their attorneys general. For example, Alabama merely requires that the attorney
general deem her intervention “proper,”113 and Arizona and Nevada also only
106
See, e.g., Yurick v. State, 875 A.2d 898, 903 (N.J. 2005) (“County prosecutors are expected to interact
freely with county and state officials in the performance of their respective responsibilities. As we have noted
before, ‘[t]here is no ordinary chain of command between the attorney-general and the county prosecutors,’ and
the State is not ‘responsible for the daily functioning of the prosecutor’s office.’”) (citations omitted).
107
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(5) (West 2009).
108
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7:34 (2013).
109
Id. § 7:11.
110
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.090 (West 2018). Accordingly, Washington is also classified as
belonging to Group C, supra Section II.C., notes 138, 148 and accompanying text, and Group D, supra Section
II.D., note 166 and accompanying text.
111
§ 43.10.090.
112
Id. Due to the unusual relationship among local prosecutors, the state attorney general, and other state
officials, Washington’s model of supersession is perched in Groups A, C, and D, supra note 101, infra notes 138
and 166.
113
ALA. CODE § 36-15-14 (2013).
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mandate that the attorney general consider such intervention “necessary.”114
Maine’s precondition is similarly loose, stating that at the “Attorney General’s
discretion,” she may “act in place of” a district attorney to initiate and control a
criminal prosecution.115 Nebraska’s approach similarly allows the attorney
general to “appear for the state and prosecute and defend, in any court . . . any
cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the state may be a party or
interested.”116 With no meaningful statutory limit placed on the exercise of this
power, and no state court decisions limiting that power, the attorneys general in
states within this third subcategory can effectively supersede a local prosecutor
in any case for any reason.
Ultimately, states within this category authorize broad grants of power to
superseding state officials. In some states, this grant of power allows the state
attorney general to effectively monopolize the direction of criminal prosecution.
In others, it neutralizes much of the rationale for granting discretion to local
prosecutors in the first place.117 While exercise of this power remains rare for
most of the states within this model,118 Alabama has empowered the state-level
prosecutors in the attorney general’s office to “get involved in areas that are
reserved for local prosecutors in other states” by becoming “‘prosecutors of last
resort’ for victims or family members.”119
The most obvious justification for this model is that all prosecutions within
a state should be uniform. This uniformity might make sense for some of the
states detailed here—namely, Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
perhaps Maine. The combination of the small populations, small geographic
sizes, and location in New England, which has limited county governments,120
perhaps results in a greater need for statewide uniformity. But the other states,
without these commonalities, have no such need. Instead, the effective result of
virtually eliminating local prosecutorial discretion is that hundreds of counties
nationwide elect local prosecutors whose decisions can be reversed and altered

114

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-193(A)(2) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 228.120(3) (West 2016).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 199 (2018).
116
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-203 (West 2009). Nebraska’s approach is perhaps more intellectually
honest, and § 204 states plainly that the attorney general and the state Department of Justice “shall have the same
powers and prerogatives in each of the several counties of the state as the county attorneys have in their
respective counties,” implying an ability to take over cases for any reason. Id.
117
Infra notes 202–04, 209–10 and accompanying text.
118
See Barkow, supra note 16, at 550.
119
Id. at 567–68.
120
Snider, supra note 105, at 75 n.11.
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at the whim of the state attorney general.121 Indeed, the election of a new attorney
general with an entirely different ideology and prosecutorial outlook could result
in a vastly different regime for state-level prosecutions.122
B. States Where a State Official Can Supersede a Local Prosecutor When It Is
in the Public Interest or in the Interest of Justice
At first glance, statutory schemes within this model look extraordinarily
similar to the schemes in the previous model. They are. But the states within this
model theoretically place weightier preconditions on supersession.
Generally, states within this model require that supersession has to be in the
public interest123 or the interests of the state.124 Some states impose additional
requirements that (attempt to) further clarify what constitutes a cognizable
“interest” or reason. Florida, for example, allows the Governor to supersede a
local prosecutor and reassign a case if she determines, “for any . . . good and
sufficient reason,” that “the ends of justice would be best served.”125
Regardless of the clarification, these are, for the most part, broad and abstract
terms that necessarily result in deference to the superseding state official,
especially when, as almost all statutes specify, these determinations are made in
the state official’s judgment126 or opinion.127 It is unclear how a court could
possibly rule that a state official’s judgment of the public interest was wrong,
save for plainly and obviously corrupt motives on her part. Therefore, it is

121
See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae Former Judges, Current and Former Prosecutors, and Legal
Community Leaders in Support of Petitioner’s Emergency Non-Routine Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto at
19, Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.3d 755 (2017) (No. SC17-653) (“Governor Scott seeks authority to supplant the
elected state attorney with his own choice whenever he disagrees with the prosecutor’s discretionary decisions.
Such a regime would render state attorneys deputies of the governor . . . .”)
122
This kind of vast policy change brought on by the election of a new government official is generally
discouraged and minimized in other contexts. See generally, Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
(discussing the value of an agency decision’s “consistency with earlier and later pronouncements” in evaluating
the validity of the decision).
123
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-1-6 (West Supp. 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 6 (West 2017); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(6) (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-5-1(6)–(8) (West 2017); Amemiya v. Sapienza,
629 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Haw. 1981).
124
IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.2(1)(b) (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:17B-107(a) (West 2010); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 18b(A)(3) (West Supp. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-100(2) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§ 157 (West 2007).
125
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.14(1) (West 2014).
126
IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.2(1)(b) (West 2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-1-6 (West Supp. 2017); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 6 (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-12-02 (West 2008); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-7-100(2) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 157 (West 2007).
127
N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:17B-107(a) (West 2010).
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possible that the preconditions placed on supersession in this model are entirely
theoretical and can almost certainly be overcome by a superseding official.
Indeed, the few courts that have heard cases arising under these laws have
been exceedingly deferential to the superseding power of state officials. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that the attorney general’s power
of supersession was “unquestionable.”128 The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed
that the attorney general could intervene “in any criminal proceedings in the
state.”129 The New Jersey Supreme Court differed slightly from its sister courts
but reached a similar conclusion. The court noted that while “[t]here is no
ordinary chain of command” between the attorney general and the local
prosecutors, the attorney general possesses the supersession power to ensure
both the uniform enforcement of the law and the “proper and efficient handling
of” the local prosecutors’ “criminal business.”130 But with relatively few cases
analyzing the scope and extent of the statutes within this model, it is hard to
definitively conclude that the preconditions placed on supersession are illusory.
Hawai’i, however, charts a slightly different path for its attorney general.
Not only are Hawai’ian courts less deferential to the attorney general’s
supersession powers, but the state supreme court established a narrow set of
circumstances that would permit intervention. Despite the fact that the state’s
local prosecutors operate “under the authority of the attorney general,”131 the
attorney general may only intervene if “compelling public interests require” her
intervention.132 This power of supersession is not granted by a particular
statute,133 but is rather acknowledged by the Hawai’i Supreme Court as existing

128

Commonwealth v. Kozlowsky, 131 N.E. 207, 211 (Mass. 1921) (citation omitted).
In re Watson, 291 N.W. 652, 655 (Mich. 1940) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
130
Yurick v. State, 875 A.2d 898, 903–04 (N.J. 2005) (citations omitted). Despite seemingly establishing
an implicit limit on the attorney general’s supersession power, the court nevertheless affirmed an exercise of the
power that reassigned the entirety of a county prosecutor’s criminal docket. Id. at 900.
131
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1.5(17) (West Supp. 2017).
132
Amemiya v. Sapienza, 629 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Haw. 1981).
133
Hawai’i is an outlier within this model, and not just because of the high threshold it requires for
supersession. Its attorney general is granted theoretically broad powers to, “unless otherwise provided by law,
prosecute cases involving violations of state laws.” HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-7 (West Supp. 2017). This broad
grant of power made sense historically, because Hawai’ian law initially created local prosecutorial offices for
each county by individual legislative acts, rather than a state law that created such a position as a default in all
counties. See Sapienza, 629 P.2d at 1128. That is not the case anymore. Current Hawai’ian law grants counties
“the power to provide by charter for the prosecution of all offenses and to prosecute for offenses against the laws
of the State.” HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1.5(17) (West Supp. 2017). Though this law makes the creation of a
local prosecutor optional, four of the five counties’ charters have done so. E.g., HONOLULU COUNTY CHARTER
art. VIII, § 8-104 (2017), https://www.honolulu.gov/rep/site/cor/Online_Charter_-_06.30.17.pdf. The fifth
county—Kalawao—has no charter because it is a former leprosy colony administered by the state department of
129
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in an extremely limited set of circumstances: “[F]or example, where the public
prosecutor has refused to act and such refusal amounts to a serious dereliction
of duty on his part, or where, in the unusual case, it would be highly improper
for the public prosecutor and his deputies to act.”134
The basic idea undergirding the statutory provisions in this model is sound:
if a state official is to supersede a local prosecutor, there should be a genuine
need for such intervention. The difficulty is that the courts interpreting these
provisions have either found that a de minimis public interest (or good reason)
satisfies the standard,135 or that such a showing is effectively unnecessary
because the power to supersede is so broad.136 If the courts engaged in a caseby-case balancing test of the official’s interest in supersession and the local
prosecutor’s interest in exercising discretion,137 this exercise would perhaps be
more meaningful, and result in different outcomes.
C. States Where the State Official Can Supersede a Local Prosecutor When
Requested to Do so by Either Another State Official or Members of the
Public
Nearly half of the states in the country allow the state attorney general to
supersede a local prosecutor if requested to do so by another actor. The most
common actor empowered to direct the attorney general to supersede a local
prosecutor is the Governor,138 though two states within this model, North Dakota

health. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 326-34(b) (West 2017); Alia Wong, When the Last Patient Dies, ATLANTIC
(May 27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/05/when-the-last-patient-dies/394163/.
134
Sapienza, 629 P.2d at 1129. Since Sapienza was decided, the Hawai’i Supreme Court has not heard
another case involving attempted supersession.
135
Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.3d 755, 757–59 (Fla. 2017).
136
Supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
137
While the purpose of this Comment is not to propose such a balancing test, it likely would not be
entirely unlike rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny.
138
GA. CONST. art. V, § 3, ⁋ IV; MD. CONST. art. V, § 3(a)(2); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-193(A)(2)
(2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-31-101(1)(a) (West Supp. 2017); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2227(3) (West
Supp. 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.2(1)(b) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-702 (West Supp. 2016); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.200(1) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.01 (West 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-37
(West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 27.030 (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(6) (West 2009); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 228.120(3) (West 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-3 (West 2012); N.Y. EXEC. LAWS § 63(2)
(McKinney Supp. 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 18b(A)(3) (West Supp. 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.070(1) (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-11-1(2) (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-5-1(8) (West 2017);
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-511(A) (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.090, 232 (West Supp. 2018); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 5-3-2 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.25(1m) (West Supp. 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 91-603(c) (West Supp. 2017).
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and Pennsylvania, exclude their Governors from this grant of power.139
However, among the states within this model, there is great variation. Six states
allow their legislatures to direct the supersession of a local prosecutor—and in
Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, a single chamber of the
legislature may do so.140 Courts—or individual judges—are also common
actors, possessing the power to direct supersession in five states.141
There are some other—perhaps less intuitive—state actors empowered to
direct supersession. For example, Iowa allows its Executive Council, composed
of the Governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, secretary of agriculture, and
state auditor,142 to collectively direct the attorney general to supersede a local
prosecutor.143 Four states similarly empower locally-elected officials to direct or
request an intervention—“a sheriff, mayor, or majority of a city [commission]”
in Kentucky;144 a county “board of chosen freeholders” (called a county
commission in most states) in New Jersey;145 the majority of a county
commission in North Dakota;146 and a county commission in Wyoming.147
Washington, as mentioned previously, grants this power to an unusual actor: the
state patrol’s organized crime intelligence unit.148 Perhaps most unusually,
Kentucky, New Jersey, and North Dakota also empower the public to direct or
request the intervention of the attorney general in a criminal prosecution.
Kentucky and New Jersey allow a grand jury to request the attorney general’s
intervention,149 and North Dakota allows “twenty-five taxpaying citizens” of a
county to petition the attorney general for intervention.150

139
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 11-16-06, 54-12-02 to -04 (West 2008); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 732-205(a)(4)–(5) (West 2012).
140
MD. CONST. art. V, § 3(a)(2); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.2(1)(b) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-702
(West Supp. 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 18b(A)(3) (West Supp. 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-11-1(2)
(West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.25(1m) (West Supp. 2017).
141
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.200(1) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:17B-106 (West 2010); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 11-16-06, 54-12-04 (West 2008); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(5)
(West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(c) (West Supp. 2017).
142
IOWA CODE ANN. § 7D.1(1) (West 2008). Imagining an analogous exercise at the federal level—in
which Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue plays a role in directing Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard
Sessions, III, to supersede a United States Attorney—is comical.
143
IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.2(1)(b) (West 2017).
144
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.200(1) (West 2010).
145
N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:17B-106 (West 2010).
146
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-12-03 (West 2008).
147
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(c) (West Supp. 2017).
148
Supra note 101. Washington’s unusual grant of power to the police to compel a prosecution seemingly
raises both serious concerns of conflicts of interest and separation of powers issues.
149
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.200(1) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:17B-106 (West 2010).
150
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-12-03 (West 2008). Though the attorney general receives an unknown
(but significant) number of petitions from the public, it is exceedingly rare for the attorney general to act on such
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Further, the statutes, in describing a “direction” or “request” that the attorney
general intervene, seemingly use these words interchangeably. But the
distinction between these terms is critical. A direction to intervene effectively
supersedes the attorney general’s discretion to, in turn, supersede the discretion
of a local prosecutor. Indeed, most states within this model impose upon the
attorney general an affirmative duty to intervene if another state actor wishes,
by requiring her to intervene when “directed” or “required” to do so.151 A few
states frame the state actor’s desire for intervention as a “request,” but
nevertheless state that the attorney general “shall” intervene in such a case,
effectively creating a direction,152 despite the arguably misleading terminology
used. Other states draw fuzzier lines, obligating the attorney general to intervene
in some situations based on the identity of the requester and the nature of the
request, while granting the attorney general discretion in other cases.153 Just

a petition. Generally, the attorney general’s office “refer[s] the petitioners to the county state’s attorney, who
may, after review, direct that an investigation be initiated.” Email from Liz Brocker, Pub. Info. Officer, N.D.
Office of Att’y Gen., to author (Oct. 2, 2017, 12:39 PM) (on file with author). For example, in 1972, citizens of
Fargo successfully petitioned the attorney general to investigate the operations of the Fargo branch office of the
North Dakota Motor Vehicle Registrar’s Office. Letter from Twenty-Five Taxpaying Citizens of Fargo, N.D.,
to Helgi Johanneson, N.D. Att’y Gen. (May 14, 1972) (on file with author). The attorney general’s office
requested that Richard Hilde, an agent with the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation, investigate the
allegations. Letter from Paul M. Sand, N.D. First Assistant Att’y Gen., to Richard Hilde, N.D. Bureau of
Criminal Investigation (May 17, 1972) (on file with author). The result of the investigation is unknown.
151
GA. CONST. ANN. art. V, § 3, ⁋ IV (“when required by the Governor”); MD. CONST. art. V, § 3(a)(2)
(“which the General Assembly by law or joint resolution, or the Governor, shall have directed or shall direct”);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-193(A)(2) (2013) (“At the direction of the governor . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-31-101(1)(a) (West Supp. 2017) (“when required to do so by the governor”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.2(1)(b)
(West 2017) (“when requested to do so by the governor, executive council, or general assembly”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-702 (West Supp. 2016) (“when required by the governor or either branch of the legislature”); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 8.01 (West 2013) (“Whenever the governor shall so request . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-37
(West 2016) (“at the request of the governor or other state officer”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 27.030 (West 2013)
(“When directed by the governor . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 228.120(3) (West 2016) (“when requested to
do so by the Governor”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-3 (West 2012) (“upon direction of the governor”); N.Y. EXEC.
LAWS § 63(2) (McKinney Supp. 2018) (“Whenever required by the governor . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74,
§ 18b(A)(3) (West Supp. 2018) (“ at the request of the Governor, the Legislature, or either branch thereof “).
152
E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 18b(A)(3) (West Supp. 2018) (noting that a duty of the attorney
general “shall be . . . to appear at the request of the Governor . . . and prosecute . . . any cause or proceeding,
civil or criminal”).
153
For example, the New Mexico attorney general is obligated to investigate a matter in a specific county
if the Governor requests her intervention but may use her discretion in deciding whether to take additional action.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-3 (West 2012). Similarly, the Wyoming attorney general may, if requested to intervene
by a county commission, exercise her discretion and intervene if she “deem[s] [it] advisable.” WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-1-603(c) (West Supp. 2017). However, she would be obligated to intervene if directed to do so by the
Governor. Id.
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three states—Kentucky, Oregon, and Pennsylvania—grant the attorney general
discretion to decide, after receiving a request, whether to intervene.154
States within this model theoretically place a powerful check on the state
officials’ supersession powers. By empowering a state official to act (only) if
requested to do so by another state official, supersession power is not solely
concentrated in one official. Instead, the power is better understood as just
another component of the state’s checks and balances. Allowing the state official
to intervene (only) if requested to do so by locally-elected officials or citizens of
the local prosecutor’s municipality carries similar benefits. In such a system, the
superseding state official is ostensibly using her power for good, by responding
to concerns of those closest to the local prosecutor’s decision-making. However,
when such a request becomes a demand and supersedes the state official’s
autonomy, these benefits evaporate. Instead, the superseding state officials are
subjected to the whims of other actors. States within this model are effectively
transformed into states within the first or second models, as in sections II.A. and
II.B., but with more bells and whistles.
D. States Where the State Official Can Supersede a Local Prosecutor if She
Refuses to (or Does Not) Enforce the Law
Some states opt for a more restrictive model of supersession, allowing
supersession only when a local prosecutor refuses or fails to act. In four states—
California, Idaho, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee—a prosecutor’s inaction is the
only circumstance that would allow for supersession.155 Of course, even absent
explicit statutory authorization, a local prosecutor’s refusal to act could still
result in supersession. If a state’s supersession regime is categorized as
belonging to the first or second models—allowing supersession in any case or
“in the public interest,” respectively—a state official would certainly have the
power to supersede an inactive local prosecutor.156
Within this model, some states require a finding by another state actor that a
local prosecutor has refused to act before the attorney general is empowered to
supersede. For example, the only circumstance in which Idaho allows
supersession by the attorney general is when the Governor concludes that “the

154
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.200(1) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 180.070(1) (West 2007); 71
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4)–(5) (West 2012).
155
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5; IDAHO CODE § 31-2227(3) (West Supp. 2017); 71
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4)–(5) (West 2012).
156
See Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.3d 755, 756–57 (Fla. 2017); supra Sections II.A., II.B.
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penal laws . . . are not being enforced as written.”157 Wyoming adds an additional
requirement that theoretically sets an even higher burden: if the local prosecutor
fails to act, and the attorney general is requested to intervene by the county
commission or the trial judge, and “if after a thorough investigation[,]
[intervention] is deemed advisable by the attorney general,” then the attorney
general may supersede the local prosecutor.158 At the other end of the spectrum
lies California, which requires its attorney general to supersede a local
prosecutor after she concludes—on her own—that “any law . . . is not being
adequately enforced.”159
Judges have a particularly strong grant of power in four states—North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wyoming. These states allow judges to
either request supersession or to order it themselves if a local prosecutor does
not act.160 In Tennessee, if a local prosecutor does not act, state law allows a
court to supersede by appointing a local prosecutor pro tempore; this is the only
allowable means of supersession.161 Wyoming similarly allows a court to
appoint a replacement prosecutor, but allows other means of supersession as
well.162
However, almost all of these statutory schemes imply a one-way standard,
only allowing supersession to be ordered if a local prosecutor fails or refuses to
prosecute.163 A few states follow a seemingly less rigid approach, allowing
supersession if the law is not “adequately enforced,”164 “not being enforced as
written,”165 or “improperly enforced.”166 This alternative approach focuses on
the enforcement of the laws overall, and not the failure or decision not to
157

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2227(3) (West Supp. 2017).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(c) (West Supp. 2017).
159
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13. Such a requirement—triggered only by the attorney general’s
determination—is a curious mental exercise, as it seemingly mandates that an attorney general intervene if she
determines, through whatever process she deems appropriate, that the law is not being enforced.
160
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 11-16-06 (West 2008); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4)–(5) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603 (West Supp. 2017); Id. § 9-1-805
(West 2007).
161
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
162
Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-805 (West 2007), with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(c) (West Supp.
2017).
163
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according to law”); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 8-5-3 (West 2012) (“failure or refusal . . . to act”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 11-16-06 (West 2008)
(“refused or neglected to perform . . . duties); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4) (West 2012)
(“failed or refused to prosecute”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(c) (West Supp. 2017) (“failure or refusal . . . to
act” or has a conflict of interest); id. § 9-1-805 (West 2007) (“refuses to act in a prosecution”).
164
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
165
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2227(3) (West Supp. 2017).
166
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.090 (West 2018).
158
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prosecute a particular case, and suggests that prosecutors are meant to pursue
justice, not necessarily convictions.167 This approach suggests that an argument
could be made for supersession when a prosecutor unethically or corruptly
initiates a prosecution. In such a case, pursuing a prosecution would be
perverting the laws, not enforcing them.
Indeed, there are instances in which a local prosecutor’s decision to initiate
a prosecution would be a perversion, rather than an enforcement, of the law.
Take, for example, the 2006 Duke University lacrosse case. Durham County
District Attorney Mike Nifong pursued baseless charges against three Duke
lacrosse players, likely with explicitly political motivations.168 After facing
widespread national scrutiny, Nifong ended up transferring the case to the state
attorney general, who dismissed the charges,169 and Nifong was ultimately
disbarred.170 Had the North Carolina attorney general possessed the ability to
supersede Nifong—or any other local prosecutor—for a failure to adequately or
properly enforce the law,171 a strong argument could have been made for
supersession in that case.
Many of these state statutes provide more meaningful protections of
prosecutorial discretion than those in other models. Instead of allowing state
officials to supersede because they feel like it or because they disagree with local
prosecutors’ discretion, this model compels a finding that the local prosecutor
acted incorrectly. Pennsylvania’s model, discussed in greater detail in section
II.E. and Part III, only allows the attorney general to supersede after
demonstrating “that the district attorney has failed or refused to prosecute and
such failure or refusal constitutes abuse of discretion.”172 The strength of
Pennsylvania’s model is that it provides greater clarity and less room for

167
Such an approach, if an accurate interpretation of the law, tracks closely with the American Bar
Association’s (ABA’s) recommendation that prosecutors “seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely
to convict,” CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARD 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015), and the Supreme Court’s observations about the proper role of a prosecutor. Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (The prosecutor “is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”).
168
Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental
Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1337, 1356 (2007).
169
Id. at 1347.
170
Id. at 1352.
171
North Carolina law does not explicitly allow supersession for that reason. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1142 (West Supp. 2017).
172
71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4) (West 2012).
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whimsical interpretation. Rather than adopting the nebulous standards of some
of the other states—which allow supersession if the local prosecutor is generally
failing to enforce the law—Pennsylvania sets a clear prerequisite with a clear
standard of review.173
E. States Where a Local Prosecutor Can Be Superseded with the Approval of
a Court (or an Independent Commission)
Unlike the preceding models, most states within this model only allow
supersession of a local prosecutor if a court or commission174 explicitly
authorizes it.175 Some statutes provide specific guidelines to guide the court’s
decision-making process, such as requiring a particularized showing of the local
prosecutor’s absence, conflict of interest, disqualification, malfeasance, or
refusal to prosecute.176 Under Louisiana’s constitution, however, the court with
original jurisdiction in a criminal prosecution may allow the attorney general to
“institute, prosecute, or intervene,” or in other words to supersede a local
prosecutor, so long as there is “cause.”177
Within this model, once a court authorizes the supersession of a local
prosecutor, it also appoints a specific replacement for that prosecutor, either as
a separate action or as an action inherent in its authorization of supersession.
Connecticut, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania give their courts no autonomy at all
to select a replacement. In Connecticut, depending on which party is making the
request, the replacement is either the chief state’s attorney or another state’s
173
Further, the Pennsylvania attorney general does have to argue that a local prosecutor’s inaction
generally reflects her failure to enforce the law. Supra notes 163–66. There are good reasons to argue that local
prosecutors should pursue justice and not convictions. Supra note 167. However, failure to generally enforce the
law and failure to pursue justice are more naturally interpreted as grounds for removal from office, not as grounds
for supersession in individual cases.
174
Because Connecticut is the only state that empowers an independent commission, the Criminal Justice
Commission, with the ability to authorize the supersession of a local prosecutor, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51277(d)(3) (West 2016), as opposed to a court, this Comment uses the word “court” interchangeably with
“commission.”
175
However, some states, such as North Dakota and Wyoming allow judicial intervention in addition to
allowing intervention by a state official. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 11-16-06 (West 2008), and WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 9-1-805 (West 2007), with N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-12-02 to -04 (West 2008), and WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(c) (West Supp. 2017).
176
E.g., TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-277(d)(3) (West 2016); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 11-16-06 (West 2008); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4) (West 2012); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.07(a) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(c) (West Supp. 2017).
177
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8. In Plaquemines Par. Comm’n Council v. Perez, the Louisiana Supreme Court
provided no additional elaboration or clarification on what “cause” is, and instead merely noted, “The ‘cause’
requirement refers to a showing that the district attorney is not adequately asserting some right or interest of the
state.” 379 So.2d 1373, 1377 (La. 1980) (citing Lee Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 37 LA. L. REV. 765, 835 (1977)).
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attorney.178 In contrast, in Louisiana and Pennsylvania, only the attorney general
may supersede and subsequently replace a local prosecutor.179 But in the
remaining states—North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming—courts
have greater autonomy to appoint a replacement of their choosing. North Dakota
courts may either request the attorney general’s intervention or appoint a
replacement attorney without restriction.180 Tennessee courts are similarly
unrestricted in appointing a county attorney general pro tempore,181 and Texas
and Wyoming courts are explicitly empowered to appoint “any competent
attorney” and “any member of the bar,” respectively.182
Unique within this model is Pennsylvania’s specific statutory scheme, which
only allows the attorney general183 to supersede a local prosecutor if she
“establishes by a preponderance of the evidence,” to a judge assigned by the
state’s highest court, “that the district attorney has failed or refused to prosecute
and such failure or refusal constitutes abuse of discretion.”184 The Third Circuit
noted that this is a “narrowly circumscribed power to supersede a district
attorney.”185 Indeed, no other state—within this model or any other186—requires
such a strong demonstration before allowing supersession.
F. Summary of State Statutory Models
Each state (theoretically) has a slightly different model for supersession, and
indeed, these five models sometimes vary wildly. Within this variation, common
questions arise and are answered with more variety still. The biggest question
concerns how a state official may intervene. In most states, if the attorney
general intervenes, she takes full control of a pending case and may unilaterally
make decisions about investigating or initiating a prosecution.187 But some states
respect the autonomy of local prosecutors more and limit the attorney general to
assisting in a prosecution.188 Of the states with such provisions, only
178

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-277(d)(3) (West 2016).
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8; 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4) (West 2012).
180
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 11-16-06 (West 2008).
181
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
182
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.07(a) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-805 (West 2007).
183
The Attorney General can intervene either by her own volition, or if the “president judge in the district
having jurisdiction” of the criminal proceeding “has reason to believe that the case is a proper one” for her
intervention. 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4)–(5) (West 2012).
184
Id. § 732-205(a)(4).
185
Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 353 (3d Cir. 1999).
186
Supra Sections II.A., II.B., II.C., II.D.
187
E.g., ALA. CODE § 36-15-14 (2013).
188
15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/4 (West 2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-1-6 (West Supp. 2017); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 199 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 6 (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-37
179
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Mississippi’s courts have interpreted the assistance provision. The Mississippi
Supreme Court observed, “The operative word in [state law] is but one: assist.
According to the statute’s plain language, the attorney general may assist a local
district attorney in the discharge of his or her duties.”189 This is an extremely
narrow superseding power. Less restrictively, some states only allow the
attorney general to control the prosecution when present,190 thereby creating a
dichotomy between greater prosecutorial discretion when the attorney general is
not present and less discretion when she is.
Plausible arguments can be made in favor of each model, and for each of the
statutes and constitutional provisions categorized within these models, but one
regime in particular stands out: Pennsylvania’s. It is the only statutory regime
that protects prosecutorial discretion while creating a clear procedure and
standard of review for permissible acts of supersession. The next Part explains
and justifies Pennsylvania’s regime in greater detail.
III. THE NEED FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND HOW TO PROTECT IT
With more criminal justice reformers winning local prosecutorial elections,
and with inconsistent state standards that frequently discard prosecutorial
discretion in favor of distant, out-of-touch decision-making by state officials, a
new approach to supersession is needed. This Part begins in section A by
defending prosecutorial discretion as a norm within our criminal justice system,
making both a practical and constitutional case for it. Next, section B identifies
a state statutory model—Pennsylvania’s—that both protects prosecutorial
discretion and provides ample opportunity to rectify genuine abuses within the
criminal justice system.
A. The Practical and Constitutional Case for Prosecutorial Discretion
With laws governing supersession of local prosecutors likely gaining
newfound importance, the current piecemeal approach is inadequate. Because
prosecutorial discretion is a concept central to our legal system,191 we must act
to create a uniform standard to protect it.

(West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 27.030 (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(6) (West 2009); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-7-100 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-5-1(8) (West 2017).
189
Williams v. State, 184 So.3d 908, 914 (Miss. 2014).
190
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 6 (West 2017).
191
E.g., William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1342 (1993).
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Prosecutorial discretion has inherent value in our judicial system. Local
prosecutors are better-acquainted with the facts and attendant circumstances of
individual cases brought by their offices than the state officials statutorily
empowered to supersede them. And with limited resources and virtually
limitless crime to prosecute, local prosecutors must make strategic decisions
about which cases to act on. With our criminal justice system in a time of
transformation, increasingly favoring reform over traditional “tough on crime”
policies,192 it is important to allow prosecutors to rely on their judgment and
proximity to their communities to determine which cases to prosecute and how
to prosecute them. But even as we defend prosecutorial discretion, we must also
recognize that deference to discretion is not, and should not be, without limit. It
is necessary for an escape valve to remain open, even if just slightly, to prevent
illegitimate abuses of power.
Courts repeatedly recognize that prosecutorial discretion ought to be
valued.193 But the loose approach that many courts have taken to interpreting the
scope of permissible supersession reveals the truth: while most states have
achieved a symbiotic equilibrium with local prosecutors in which supersession
is rare,194 they certainly are not obligated to maintain that equilibrium. Instead,
the equilibrium is only supported as a byproduct (perhaps an unintentional one)
of each state’s system of checks and balances. The only obstacle truly preventing
supersession from becoming commonplace is the restraint of the state officials
who possess superseding power.
While this equilibrium should be supported, it should not be supported at the
cost of treating local prosecutors as mere political actors, akin to executive or
legislative branch officials. Treating the decision of a local prosecutor similarly
to the decision of a state agency or the Governor—by allowing superseding state
officials to overrule local prosecutors at will—blurs the practical and democratic
significance of a prosecutor’s decision.
Actions taken within the judicial and criminal realms are, and should be,
treated differently from political actions. The American criminal justice system
seeks, as the ABA notes, “justice within the bounds of the law.”195 Following
several centuries of evolving jurisprudence, our current legal system reflects that
pursuit of justice. The federal Constitution—and parallel state constitutions—
clearly set apart criminal proceedings from civil proceedings and other state
192
193
194
195

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.3d 755, 760–62 (Fla. 2017) (Pariente, J., dissenting).
Barkow, supra note 16, at 550.
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 167.
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actions.196 For example, states are explicitly prohibited from passing bills of
attainder or ex post facto laws.197 Specific rules governing criminal procedure
found in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments have been
incorporated against the states,198 but protections governing civil proceedings
found in the Seventh Amendment have not.199 This is a difference that reveals
implicit—and important—differences between the criminal and civil realms of
law.
Further, the interplay between political and judicial actors is fundamentally
different from the relationship between local prosecutors and judicial actors.
While the executive and legislative branches can pass laws and amend
constitutions to abrogate most court decisions, in no circumstance can a branch
abrogate a court holding that a particular person cannot be charged with a
particular crime. Further, federal and state courts are extraordinarily reluctant to
intervene in legislative policymaking and to answer political questions. Courts
reject challenges to perfectly constitutional acts of legislation because
legislatures are entitled to make subjectively “bad” policy decisions if they so
choose.200 But courts will sometimes intervene in criminal proceedings, to
ensure that prosecutors “refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction.”201 The stakes in criminal proceedings are far greater,
because a wrong decision means that an innocent party’s rights are violated, the
guilty party goes free, or the victim is deprived of justice.
Treating prosecutorial decisions as merely political decisions violates the
spirit—though admittedly not the letter—of the Constitution.202 Instead, local

196

Infra, notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
198
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764–65 n.12 (2010) (listing the provisions of the Bill of
Rights that have been incorporated to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
199
Id. at 765 n.13.
200
Indeed, in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Thomas indicated that while he would vote to uphold Texas’s
ban on sodomy as a member of the Court, if he “were a member of the Texas Legislature, [he] would vote to
repeal it.” 539 U.S. 558, 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); supra note 167. However, some criminal justice
reformers argue that the courts have turned a blind eye to prosecutorial abuses. See Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum
Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV.
1, 24–25 (2009).
202
The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected the notion that a prosecutor is an “executive branch”
member and therefore subject to traditional checks and balances. See generally Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 420–21 (1976) (noting that, unlike executive branch officials, prosecutors possess “a form of ‘quasijudicial’ immunity . . . derivative of the immunity of judges”) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has further
held that the political question doctrine is inapplicable to prosecutorial actions, providing further support for the
view that prosecutors are not political actors. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974).
197
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prosecutors should be treated as “quasi-judicial officers.”203 Decisions about
how and whom to prosecute should not be subjected to the same pressures as
political decisions, because doing so opens the door to corrupt motives and
results. Prosecutors are only partially dependent on political actors for their grant
of power, in that prosecutors can only pursue criminal charges for acts which the
political actors have criminalized. Increasing prosecutors’ dependence on
political actors would subject them to the political whims of whichever state
officials are in power at any given time and would detract from their sworn duty
to independently pursue justice.204
Indeed, the American legal system strongly disfavors using criminal law as
a proxy for political decisions. Though since our nation’s founding, politicallymotivated prosecutions have been conducted against politicians of all
ideologies,205 they nonetheless taint the criminal justice system. Political
prosecutions violate basic tenets of due process and allow the government to
punish dissidents for their opinions, a clear violation of the First Amendment.206
Today, politicians of both parties condemn what they perceive to be “political
prosecutions”—though they unsurprisingly disagree on what constitutes a
“political prosecution”—reflecting the near-universal disapproval of the
practice,207 much to the dissatisfaction of would-be demagogues.208
Further, basic principles of democratic and political accountability strongly
indicate that local prosecutors are meant to have at least a minimal level of
discretion. Forty-six of the fifty states provide for the election of local
prosecutors.209 While the merits of using elections to select local prosecutors can

203
Amended Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 121, at 8–10; Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th
Cir. 1967) (“The prosecuting attorney is an officer of the court, holding a quasi[-]judicial position.”) (emphasis
added); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 589–90 (3d Cir. 1966) (noting that a prosecutor’s “primary responsibility
is essentially judicial—the prosecution of the guilty and the protection of the innocent”) (citation omitted);
Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1535 (2012) (noting that
“many [original] state constitutions classified district attorneys as functionaries of the judicial branch”).
204
Supra note 167.
205
See Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law 8–9 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 87, 2005), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1230&context=public_law_and_legal_theory.
206
See id. at 18–19.
207
For example, calls by Donald Trump and other prominent Republicans to prosecute Hillary Clinton for
something, David A. Graham, Trump Demands the Prosecution of His Defeated Rival, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/trump-justice-department-clinton/544928/, reflect the
kind of political prosecutions that could easily occur at the state level in the future without strong protections of
local prosecutorial discretion.
208
Id.
209
Ellis, supra note 203, at 1530 n.3.
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be fiercely debated,210 it seems inapposite to the electoral system to allow state
officials to supersede a local prosecutor in almost any case. If that were true,
what would be the point of electing them in the first place? To elect an official
to a position means that some power is imputed to her. In no other context do
we elect public officials who are entirely subservient to another branch of
government and another government actor with no independent power of their
own.
But this debate, which questions the extent to which we should devolve
power to local elected officials, does not operate in a vacuum. Throughout the
country, state governments are overriding and preempting efforts by local
governments to, among other things, increase the minimum wage,211 expand
civil rights,212 create new rights for workers,213 and protect the environment.214
While these preemption efforts are arguably hypocritical for state politicians
who otherwise favor “small government,”215 they put the looming supersession
of local prosecutorial discretion in political context and represent yet another
manner in which local prosecutors are improperly treated as mere political
actors.
In this discussion, many questions about separation of powers and the merits
of devolution of power (and federalism more generally) arise. It is unnecessary
to reach conclusions on all of these far-reaching issues, but rather to address the
issue at hand: the preservation of prosecutorial discretion and the limitations on
state officials’ supersession powers.
210
Indeed, there is a strong argument that local prosecutors should not be elected. The United States is the
only country in the world that elects local prosecutors, and it is curious that we do so in partisan elections, as
most states do, with relatively few restrictions on campaign finance. Electing prosecutors seemingly indebts
them to other actors—like interest groups, businesses, politicians, ideological organizations, and partisan
constituencies—on whom they rely for fundraising and votes in future elections. See, e.g., Andrew Novak, It’s
Too Dangerous to Elect Prosecutors, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 24, 2015, 1:12 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/
its-too-dangerous-to-elect-prosecutors.
211
Yuki Noguchi, As Cities Raise Minimum Wages, Many States Are Rolling Them Back, NPR (July 18,
2017, 4:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/07/18/537901833/as-cities-raise-minimum-wages-many-states-arerolling-them-back.
212
David A. Graham, North Carolina Overturns LGBT-Discrimination Bans, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/north-carolina-lgbt-discrimination-transgenderbathrooms/475125/.
213
Dave Jamieson, Paid Sick Leave Laws Preemptively Voided By Republican Governors, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 18, 2013, 1:09 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/paid-sick-leave-laws-voidedrepublicans_n_3460020.html.
214
Jim Malewitz, Curbing Local Control, Abbott Signs “Denton Fracking Bill”, TEX. TRIB. (May 18,
2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/05/18/abbott-signs-denton-fracking-bill/.
215
Charles P. Pierce, This Week in the Laboratories of Hypocrisy, ESQUIRE (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.
esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a51933/conservatives-small-government/
(“Small
government
conservatives don’t seem fond of local governments.”).
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B. The Solution: An Abuse of Discretion Standard
Even accepting the adoption of a new model of prosecutorial supersession,
any model is going to make different people unhappy at different times. Suppose
that a locally-elected prosecutor uses her discretion to not pursue charges in any
of the following cases:
A. Drug possession charges against a known drug addict.
B. Homicide charges against a police officer who killed a motorist
during a traffic stop.
C. Corruption charges against the prosecutor’s close political ally and
campaign contributor.
Generally speaking, a liberal actor might agree with the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in A and disagree with it in B. Conversely, a
conservative actor might agree with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in B
and disagree with it in A. And though we might hope that all actors would
disapprove of the prosecutor’s actions in C, the reality is that the perception
might be altered by the prosecutor’s and the actor’s political affiliation and
ideology.
These examples helpfully illustrate that actors will view the same concept—
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—differently depending on the
surrounding context and circumstances. While it may be tempting to suggest the
adoption of a shrewdly-tailored model that would achieve one’s desired result
in all circumstances, such a model would be clunky and likely indefensible.
Views of prosecutorial discretion—much like views of the Recess Appointments
Clause216 and the Senate filibuster—are highly dependent on an actor’s position
and whether her party is in power. Of course, we should always strive to discern
the best rule, regardless of our partisan preferences. Accordingly, any ideal
model of prosecutorial discretion should be created with a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance, in which no actor knows exactly how the model will impact her
desired policy outcomes.217
216
“A given interpretation may be good for your team at one point in history and bad at another. Therefore,
ideology and the appeal of desired outcomes in the short-term can more easily be set aside here than when
considering many substantive constitutional issues.” Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A
Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 443 (2005).
217
“Imagine that you have set for yourself the task of developing a totally new social contract for today’s
society. How could you do this fairly? . . . Rawls proposes that you imagine yourself in an original position
behind a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, you know nothing about yourself . . . or your position in society . . .
. In this original position, behind the veil of ignorance, what will the rational person choose? What fundamental
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The question of which model of prosecutorial discretion should be adopted
can be at least partially framed as a standard of review question. When a trial
court makes findings of fact, an appellate court reviews those findings under a
deferential standard of review.218 Logically, this relationship makes sense—a
trial court is the best-acquainted with the factual issues in any given case,
because it has seen the evidence and heard the testimony firsthand.219 Less
obviously, a trial court has a greater cognitive understanding of how certain
kinds of cases are conducted within its jurisdiction—how attorneys generally
behave, what actions prosecutors’ offices generally take, etc.220 An appellate
court, however, cannot be guaranteed to appreciate the significance of any of
these things. A judge reading briefs and the transcript on appeal will not be able
to get the same feel for the reliability of a piece of evidence or a witness’s
testimony that a trial judge would.
Similarly, when a local prosecutor receives a case, conducts interviews with
witnesses and victims, reviews evidence, and consults with law enforcement,
she is better acquainted with the facts of the case than the Governor, attorney
general, legislature, or any other state actor ever could be.221 The exercise of the
prosecutor’s discretion to charge or not to charge, therefore, is analogous to the
exercise of a trial court’s discretion in reaching a factual finding. Therefore, an
abuse of discretion standard of review should be applied to the decision of the
prosecutor, not to the decision of the superseder.
In Ayala v. Scott, the Florida Supreme Court embraced the abuse of
discretion standard, holding that it would review Governor Scott’s supersession
of Ayala “similar to the way in which it reviews exercises of discretion by the
lower courts.”222 But notably, the court applied it to the wrong party’s action: it
judged the Governor’s Executive Order—not Ayala’s initial exercise of
discretion—under the abuse standard.
principles of society will operate? For Rawls, the best principles will be fair principles. The individual cannot
know whether she . . . would suffer or benefit from the structure of any biased institutions. Therefore, the safest
principles will provide for the highest minimum standards of justice in the new society.” SPENCER J. MAXCY,
ETHICAL SCHOOL LEADERSHIP 93 (2002).
218
E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) and comparable state rules.
219
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985).
220
JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 38 (1980) (noting that “local
prosecution [results in] applying local standards to the enforcement of essentially local laws”).
221
Even assuming, arguendo, that state officials and local prosecutors live and work in the same cities,
state officials handle statewide matters instead of local matters on a day-to-day basis. Even when the superseding
state actors are county or city officials, supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text, their official portfolios and
responsibilities (and likely lack of legal education) prevent them from appreciating the significance of a local
prosecutor’s actions.
222
Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.3d 755, 758 (Fla. 2017).
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By holding as it did in Ayala v. Scott, the Florida Supreme Court effectively
applied a de novo standard of review to the local prosecutor’s action and an
abuse of discretion standard of review to that of the superseding actor. Such a
decision is altogether backwards, and would be comparable to the U.S. Supreme
Court holding that it would review a factual finding made by an appellate court
under abuse of discretion, while in turn applying a de novo standard of review
to findings made by the trial court. Applying such a holding would turn all of
the rationale behind an abuse of discretion standard of review on its head,
because none of the rationale favoring abuse of discretion could possibly apply
to an appellate court—or to a superseding actor.
Adopting an abuse of discretion model explicitly tied to review of the
prosecutor’s actions, like Pennsylvania has, would allow local prosecutors
authority to set their priorities. This broad grant of authority may result in the
increased prosecution of some offenses, and the decreased prosecution of others.
Such prioritization would easily survive under an abuse of discretion standard
as a necessary consequence of limited resources.
More importantly, local prosecutors would be empowered to base criminal
prosecutions on the values and desires of their constituencies. A local prosecutor
might not pursue the death penalty if she represents a predominantly Catholic
community that disfavors capital punishment. A prosecutor in such a situation
might conclude that, for her office to have legitimacy in the eyes of the
community, she must consider the values of the community before acting. It is
true that opponents of such decisions might point out the incongruity of pursuing
the death penalty in some counties but not in others.223 However, disparities in
discretionary decisions are commonplace in prosecutorial offices—and other
areas of the government more generally224—and usually do not raise concerns
of abuse of power. For example, suppose a populous, urban municipality, like
Baltimore, experiences particularly high murder rates. A local prosecutor might
logically conclude that the risk to her community from murder is greater than
that from drug abuse, and accordingly shift prosecutorial resources from

223
Joint Response of Governor Rick Scott and Attorney General Pam Bondi Opposing Emergency Petition
for Extraordinary Writ at 36, Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.3d 755 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC17-653) (“[T]he Governor could
reasonably have concluded that Ayala’s blanket policy declaration . . . was apt to have an adverse impact on the
. . . uniform administration of criminal justice.”).
224
See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (noting that local authorities
can make a classification if it “has relation to the purpose for which it is made and does not contain the kind of
discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection”).
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narcotics to violent crimes. Such a choice is rational and common in our current
system.225
But even if a county wishes to alter its priorities in prosecution for reasons
other than the allocation of limited resources, a political subdivision of the
United States is entitled to “serve as a laboratory[,] and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”226 For example,
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, then-Miami local prosecutor Janet Reno
unveiled a revolutionary system to divert first-time drug offenders to
rehabilitation rather than prison.227 Reno and other prosecutors are perfectly
capable of concluding that rehabilitation efforts for low-level drug users provide
greater benefit to local communities than incarceration, even though the law
permits incarceration. In most cases—barring unconstitutional discrimination or
conflicts of interest—these motivated decisions would survive abuse of
discretion.
Supersession advocates argue that instances of prosecutorial misconduct,
especially in improperly pursuing the death penalty in a racist manner or against
actually innocent defendants, justify stricter oversight of local prosecutors.228
Indeed, in many cases, prosecutors have abused their discretion to withhold
evidence and to pursue racially-motivated cases in opportunistic ploys to win reelection.229 But an abuse of discretion standard of review does not absolutely
defer to the decisions of prosecutors; it instead provides ample room for courts
to rectify illegitimate abuses.
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania statute serves as a starting point for
developing a workable model. Under Pennsylvania law:
225
Howell, supra note 97, at 286 (“It is well known that prosecutors possess nearly unfettered discretion
to charge or to decline to charge, and thus are the most powerful actors in the criminal justice system.”) (citations
omitted).
226
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
227
Ronald Smothers, Miami Tries Treatment, Not Jail, in Drug Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/19/us/miami-tries-treatment-not-jail-in-drug-cases.html.
228
See Jonathan DeMay, Note, A District Attorney’s Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty: Toward
an Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 780–86 (1999) (noting the improper influences on
prosecutors in deciding whether to seek the death penalty); Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of
Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 134–35 (2007) (noting that
prosecutorial misconduct is aggravated by a lack of transparency, poor ethical guidelines, and a lack of
accountability).
229
Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors for
Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 915 n.132 (2015) (“[I]t is obvious that
even the most honorable prosecutors have a built-in conflict of interest in deciding what to produce to the defense
before trial. This opinion is supported by the myriad cases of undisclosed exculpatory evidence in the [National]
Registry of Exonerations.”); supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
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Supersession shall be ordered if the Attorney General establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the district attorney has failed or
refused to prosecute and such failure or refusal constitutes abuse of
discretion.230

This is, as mentioned previously, a strict standard.231 It is also a one-way
standard, because it only contemplates supersession when a prosecutor does not
act; it makes no mention of supersession when a prosecutor acts erroneously.232
Modifying Pennsylvania’s one-way supersession standard into a two-way
supersession standard more accurately reflects the spectrum of situations in
which supersession might be legitimately necessary, in instances of both
negligent inaction and negligent action. Indeed, had a Pennsylvania-type, twoway model been in place at the time of Mike Nifong’s prosecution in the Duke
lacrosse case,233 the North Carolina attorney general likely would have been able
to successfully supersede to stop the prosecution. Nifong’s actions likely would
not have survived review under an abuse of discretion standard.
Such a two-way standard preserves most exercises of prosecutorial
discretion, but allows for supersession in true instances of misconduct and
impropriety. A modified Pennsylvania standard might look something like this:
Supersession shall be ordered if the Attorney General establishes, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the local prosecutor has made a
decision to prosecute or not to prosecute that constitutes abuse of
discretion.

Of course, adopting an abuse of discretion model would not eliminate all
restraints that states can put on exercises of prosecutorial discretion. State
legislatures could still impeach prosecutors for their actions,234 gerrymander
judicial circuits to ensure that favored prosecutors get elected,235 enable voters
to recall their local prosecutors,236 cut funding to local prosecutors pursuing

230
231

71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4) (West 2012).
Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 353 (3d Cir. 1999); supra note 185 and accompanying

text.
232

Supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
234
See Ben Montgomery, Aramis Ayala: The Florida State Attorney Who Refuses to Pursue the Death
Penalty, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/aramis-ayala-theflorida-state-attorney-who-refuses-to-pursue-the-death/2317890.
235
See Anna Blythe & Craig Jarvis, GOP Wants New Election Maps for NC Judges and Prosecutors,
NEWS & OBSERVER (June 26, 2017, 2:02 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/statepolitics/article158264799.html.
236
See generally Sean Robinson, Petition to Recall Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist Filed, NEWS
TRIB. (June 24, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article26347357.html.
233
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disfavored policies,237 or even make local prosecutorial positions appointed,
rather than elected. However, these legislative powers should not be altogether
eliminated. There are normative, policy-based arguments for and against each
of these actions, but those arguments are entirely outside the scope of this
Comment.
CONCLUSION
The election of criminal justice reformers as local prosecutors reflects an
impressive shift in American public opinion over the last several decades.
Liberal, urban communities have seen firsthand the effects of “tough-on-crime”
policies, and have opted instead for prosecutorial candidates who favor a
different approach: the adoption of diversion programs, the end of cash bail, the
decision to not prosecute low-level drug charges, and alternatives to the death
penalty. As this trend in public opinion becomes stronger, not weaker, it is likely
that more and more of these reformers, with many different ideologies and
priorities, will be elected in all parts of the country.
But with state laws on the books allowing the supersession of these local
prosecutors, the practical impact of their elections might end up being minimal
if state leaders cling to their “tough-on-crime” policies. These state laws come
in many different forms, with varying degrees of deference to local prosecutors,
but very few have ever been used before. The rarity of their use is likely because
of a mutually-beneficial equilibrium that has developed between state officials
empowered with supersession and the local prosecutors—the state officials will
only rarely supersede, and the local prosecutors will dutifully enforce all of the
laws of the state. As reformers are increasingly elected and upset that balance,
the use of supersession laws will become increasingly common.
After surveying all states’ supersession laws, this Comment identified one
in particular—Pennsylvania’s—that both protects prosecutorial discretion and
prevents illegitimate abuses of power, and recommended the adoption of a

237

Sago, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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slightly-modified version. In adopting a modified Pennsylvania standard, this
Comment seeks to do something somewhat unusual in academia—advocate to
preserve status quo equilibrium so that the criminal justice revolution can
continue unimpeded.
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